THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

RESALE OF DIGITAL WORKS UNDER COPYRIGHT LAWS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
DR. MUHAMMAD MASUM BILLAH
ABSTRACT
Through the first sale doctrine, copyright laws around the world establish for an owner of the copy of
a copyrighted work the right to resell, lend, donate, and, in some cases, even to rent the copy. Under
the doctrine, the copyright holder loses any control over the future distribution of a copy of the work
after the sale of that copy. The purchaser of the copy is free to treat it like any other property she
possesses. She can transfer it to anyone else through a resale or donation. The doctrine is part of the
balance copyright law strikes between the interests of copyright holders and those of purchasers of
the copies. While the right still exists in law, in most digital works copyright holders and their
distributers deprive purchasers of this right through digital right management (DRM) technologies
and contractual terms. By establishing the continued justifications of this right in the context of
digital works, the paper argues for its preservation and recommends for necessary legislative
changes to guarantee the application of the first sale doctrine to digital works.
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RESALE OF DIGITAL WORKS UNDER COPYRIGHT LAWS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
DR. MUHAMMAD MASUM BILLAH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright laws around the world recognize the right an owner of a copy of a
copyrighted work has to resell, lend, donate, and, to some extent, even to rent the
copy.1 This right exists also in other areas of intellectual property law such as patent
and trademark.2 In the context of copyright, the right is known as either ‘copyright
exhaustion’ or ‘first sale doctrine’.3 After the first sale of a copy, the control of the
copyright holder4 over the future distribution of that copy is exhausted. The
purchaser of the copy is free to treat it like any other property she possesses. She can
transfer it to someone else through a resale or donation. She is free to lend the copy
to others with or without any benefits in return. The doctrine is part of the balance
copyright law attempts to make between the interests of copyright holders and those
of purchasers of the copies.5 The doctrine is based on the law’s general abhorrence
towards any restraint on the alienation of one’s personal property.6 While these
rights still exist in law, in most digital works copyright holders and their distributers
have taken away these rights from the users of digital copies through digital right
management (DRM) technologies and contractual terms. This paper argues for the
preservation of this important right of copyright users in digital works. This paper is
divided into four parts. Part I briefly discusses the legal and technological means
* © Dr. Muhammad Masum Billah 2018. Assistant Professor at College of Law, Sultan Qaboos
University, Oman. The author presented an earlier version of the paper at the 15th ASLI (Asian Law
Institute) Annual Conference held at Seoul National University, South Korea, on May 10-11,
2018. He received his Doctorate of Laws (LL.D) from the University of Ottawa, Canada, LL.M from
the University of Alberta, Canada, and LL.B from the International Islamic University Malaysia.
1 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 109(b)(1)(A) (2018); Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, art. 3(1)(h)(i),
(Can.); Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Royal Decree 65, art. 6(d), (2008 Oman). The
purchaser of a copy does not have the right to rent the copy containing computer program or musical
sound recording. The right to rent is given exclusively to the copyright holder in the sound
recordings.
2 The purchaser of a patented product or trademarked product can resell the purchased product
without any permission from the holder of patent or trademark.
3 See Jeremy de Beer & Robert Tomkowicz, Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights in
Canada,
25
CANADIAN
INTELL.
PROP.
REV.
3,
3-4
(2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1636425. The paper will use the words ‘first
sale doctrine’ and ‘copyright exhaustion’ interchangeably.
4 We use the words ‘copyright holders’ to mean both authors/artists of copyrighted works and
their publishers/producers. While copyright initially lies with authors and artists, in many cases
authors and artists would assign their rights to publishers and producers as part of publication or
production agreement.
5 Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L. J. 741, 743-744 (2015),
http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-64/issue-3/articles/rebalancing-copyright-exhaustion.html.
6 R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577,
580 (2003), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=2233&context=bclr.
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copyright holders use to restrict resale or transfer of a digital copy, and the legality of
such means. Part II takes up the detailed arguments in favor of the application of the
first sale doctrine to digital copies, while Part III criticizes and rebuts the arguments
against applying the doctrine to digital works. Finally, Part IV recommends the
necessary legislative changes to guarantee the application of the doctrine to digital
works.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Restrictions on the Transfer of Digital Works
Copyright holders can and, in most cases, do prevent any transfer or resale of a
digital work from the purchaser of a copy to someone else. This is usually done
through two means: one is technological and the other is legal. The technological
means involves the use of digital right management (DRM) technologies to restrict
any transfer of a digital work from a purchaser’s account or device to another
person’s account or device. The legal means consists of the inclusion of contractual
terms in the initial transaction either to characterize the transaction as a ‘license,’ or
to expressly prohibit the resale or transfer of the digital copy if such transfer is
possible in the first place. Many contracts involving the access to a digital work
characterize the transaction as a ‘license’ instead of ‘purchase’.7 As licensee, they are
restricted from the transfer of the digital copies of a copyrighted work. Sometimes the
duration of such license can be the lifetime of the ‘licensee’. This practice is more
common in the context of software.8 Preventing resale of the used and older versions
of software allows copyright holders to charge very high price for all new users
without any opportunity for these users to get the lower-priced older versions from
the secondary market.9
In general, the current legislation and case law permit both sets of technological
and legal measures copyright holders use to prevent the application of the first sale
doctrine to digital works. As for the technological means, circumvention of DRM
technologies, even for some legitimate purposes such as the resale of a purchased
copy, would be illegal under the laws of most countries.10 The copyright or related
laws generally prohibit the circumvention of technological measures used by
copyright holders to restrict any actions of users “which are not authorized by the
authors concerned, or permitted by law.”11 Even if an action such as the resale of a
7 See Christiana Mulligan, Copyright without Copying, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 472473 (2017), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1473&context=cjlpp.
8 Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L.
REV. 55, 128 (2014), https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2912&context=l
awreview.
9 Id.
10 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(A)(1) (2018); Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in 17
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205, §§ 41.1(1)(a)(b)(c)); Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, (Can.); Law on
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Royal Decree 65, (2008 Oman).
11 See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO]. Similar wordings also appear in World Intellectual Property
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digital copy by its purchaser would be legal under copyright laws,12 to circumvent a
technological means preventing such resale would be illegal if not authorized by the
copyright holder. The same laws also ban the manufacture, import, sale, distribution,
and rental of any device or service, the primary purpose of which is to circumvent
effective technological measures.13 Copyright holders commonly use such
technological measures to prevent any transfer of a digital copy by an initial
purchaser to others.
As for the legal means characterizing the transaction involving digital works as
a ‘license,’ or restricting further transfer of a digital copy, courts generally enforce
such contractual terms. For example, in the American case of Vernor v. Autodesk,
Inc.,14 the Ninth Circuit held that if a transaction were termed as a license rather
than a sale, then any subsequent transfer would require permission from the grantor
of the license. The Second Circuit seems to have adopted a better approach in Krause
v. Titleserv, Inc.,15 where the court looked at the nature of the transaction such as its
duration, or the rights of a “licensee,” to determine whether the alleged transaction
was a license or transfer of ownership. The European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ)
also adopted a similar approach. The EUCJ held that if the license were for an
indefinite period of time, it would be a sale rather than a license.16 Accordingly, the
EUCJ allowed the transfer of software bought under a license with no time limit in
light of the copyright exhaustion or first sale doctrine. The EUCJ held that the
doctrine of exhaustion applied to the digital copy of a software. This decision may not
pose a strong hurdle for copyright holders to digital works if the duration of license is
less than the lifetime of the transferee. However, most digital works today have no
time limit for a customer to use and the transactions should be considered a
“purchase” rather than a “license,” regardless of the term in actual contracts.17
B. Arguments in Favor of Resale of Digital Works
There are various arguments for the preservation of first sale doctrine in digital
works. The most important among them is that the doctrine increases the overall
utility of users of copyrighted works in more than one way and, in the process, raises
the net social utility. Other arguments supporting the doctrine in digital works
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 18, December 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
As the primary concern of these conventions is the protection of authors’ and performers’ rights in
the context of digital technology and the Internet, they are known together as the ‘Internet Treaties.’
See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205, §§ 41.1(1)(a)(b)(c); Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, (Can.); Law
on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Royal Decree 65, art. 40(1), (2008 Oman) (for national law
implementing the listed treaties).
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
13 See Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Royal Decree 65, art. 40(2), (2008 Oman);
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, art. 41.1(1)(a)(b)(c), (Can.).
14 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010).
15 Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005).
16 Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp. 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 (available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0128).
17 See generally About ebooks, EBOOKS.COM, https://www.ebooks.com/information/customerlicen
se.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2018) (This is definitely the case with e-books sold in Amazon, eBooks.com, Barnes & Noble and Kobo.).
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include preservation of a work, saving of information cost, and the privacy of users
who purchase used digital works. We elaborate these arguments below.
1. Increased Utility for Users
First, people who could not or would not buy a copyrighted work because of the
monopoly price the copyright holder charges may purchase the work at a lower price
in a resale transaction. In the absence of a secondhand market for digital works, the
price of these works may remain high due to the lack of any competition from the
secondhand market.18 People who value a copyrighted work above its price in the
secondhand market but below the price charged by the copyright holder would not
buy the work. For example, if ten people derive different values from reading a book
such as $1, 2, 3, and so on up to 10. The total benefits they would derive are $55
(1+2+3+…10). If the copyright holder charges $5 for the book, only people who value
the book at $5 and above would buy it. The total benefits they would derive are $45
(5+6+7…10). The people who derive utility less than $5 from reading the book would
not buy it, and the total utility loss from their non-use would be $10.19 This loss can
be prevented at least partially if initial purchasers can sell their copies later at a
lower price in the secondary market. In the absence of a first sale doctrine to digital
works, or the inability to resell due to technological barriers, such resale would not
happen. In such cases, the loss of utility for these buyers would be a social loss if not
offset by any additional gains obtained by the copyright holders.20 Empirical research
shows that 84 percent of the purchasers of used books in Amazon would not have
purchased the new books due to their high price set by the copyright holders and
publishers.21
Second, a potential buyer would derive more utility from a product with the
option to resell it after her use, than the utility she derives from the same product if
she could not resell it. A purchaser may be willing to pay an even higher price for a

18 See Eric M. Hinkes, Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/First Sale Doctrines,
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 685, 701 (2007); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Shultz,
Digital
Exhaustion,
58
UCLA
L.
REV.
889,
894
(2011),
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2246&context=facpubs. It is also
possible to argue that in the absence of the first sale doctrine the price of the digital goods would be
cheaper because the copyright holders would be able to sell more copies and thus reduce the price for
each copy sold. Which of these two possibilities occur in an actual case in the absence of secondary
market for digital works may depend on many other factors, such as the target group of a digital
work, cross elasticity of demand for a digital work, and reputation of an author or publisher.
19 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 112 (2004) (reference for an
example).
20 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 90-91 (2008).
The copyright
owners of digital goods may derive higher utility or producer surplus from their copyrighted works
by charging higher price in the absence of secondary market. If the demand for a digital work is
elastic, such higher price may ultimately reduce the total revenue. This in turn may lead to price
reduction of the work. Whether the demand is elastic or inelastic depends on various factors such as
availability of close substitutes, whether the product is necessity or luxury, time horizon etc.
21 Anindya Ghose, Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Internet Exchanges for Used Books: An
Empirical Analysis of Product Cannibalization and Welfare Impact, 17 INFO. SYS. RES. 3, 5 (2006),
https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/isre.1050.0072.
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digital work with the right to resell,22 indicating higher utility for the purchaser from
such work. This is simply because the effective price of a work for the purchaser
would be much less than the price she initially pays. The effective price would be
equal to the price of the new copy the purchaser pays minus the price she obtains
from the resale of the same work.23 Instead of completely limiting the ability to resell,
copyright holders may at least provide prospective buyers the options to purchase a
digital work both with and without the right to resell. Copyright holders may charge
higher price for a work with the option to resell than the price for the same work
without such option. Such options will preserve the right to resell if the price
difference between the two options is reasonable.24 However, copyright holders may
charge such a high price for a copy with the option to resell that the exercise of the
right may become practically useless.25
Third, transfer of product from one person to another usually increases the
utility of both the transferor and the transferee. A transfer or trade happens when
the buyer values a product more than the seller. Such a transfer is thus mutually
beneficial.26 This is one of the justifications for inclusion of the right to transfer in the
bundle of rights the owner of a property usually has. If a transfer or trade is
beneficial, its benefit should not be limited to the instances of sale from copyright
holders to initial purchasers. The purchasers of copies also should be able to resell
their purchased copies. After reading a book, the value of the book to its purchaser
may decrease. Thus, the purchaser should be able to sell the book to someone else
who values it more than the initial purchaser. Even though the second purchaser can
buy the book directly from the copyright holder, the copyright holder may not reduce
the price to an amount the second purchaser is willing to pay. On the other hand, the
first purchaser may sell the book at such a price, leading to a mutually beneficial and
utility-enhancing transaction between the two. In the absence of a first sale doctrine
in digital works, this transaction would not occur. The loss of utility from this
potential transaction would be a social loss without any countervailing benefits.
Finally, preventing transfer of digital works may reduce the utility of an
altruistic purchaser. For example, after reading an e-book, the purchaser may want
to donate the book to a library, or to a less fortunate person out of altruism. The
feeling or the utility (‘warm glow’)27 the donor derives from such transfer counts in
See Katz, supra note 8, at 136.
See Reese, supra note 6, at 587.
24 A reasonable price for a copy with the option to resell should be less than double the price of a
copy with no such option. Suppose the price of a copy with no option to resell is $5 and the price of a
copy with the option is $9. Here the difference is reasonable. In such case, a purchaser may still buy
the copy with the option to resell at a price of $9 in the hope that she can resell the copy after her
use at a price above $4 but below $5, the price of a new copy with no option to resell. It is possible to
show that even if the price of a copy with the option to resell is more than double the price of a copy
with no such option, people may still buy the copy with the right to resell in the hope of reselling the
used copy at a price higher than the price of a new copy with no option to resell. A prospective buyer
may pay higher price for the used copy with the option to resell further than the price of a new copy
with no such option.
25 See the discussion in the above note.
26 See generally SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 18-20.
27 See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of WarmGlow Giving 100 THE ECON J. 464, 464 (1990), https://econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Courses/UCSBpf/warmgl
ow.pdf.
22
23
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the measure of social welfare.28 In addition, the recipient of the book from the donor
also obtains utility from the donated book. If the recipient of the gift is a public
library, the utility of everyone who would borrow and read the book from the library
should be also included in the measure of total utility.29 In the absence of a first sale
doctrine to digital works, these additional utilities from the donation of a used book
would be lost. It may be argued that, in the absence of a first sale doctrine to digital
works, the donor may simply donate the price of a book to a person to buy it.
However, the disutility from paying the full price of a book may be higher than the
disutility of donating a book after its use.30 The disutility would be lower when the
donor could use the book first before he donates it, making the donation more likely
in such case. In case of a used book, the donor would capture some utility from
reading the book before donation. For example, if the price of the book is $15 but the
utility derived from the donation of the book is only $5, the donation may not take
place in the absence of the right to transfer. On the other hand, with the right to
transfer used books, the donor may donate the book she purchases for $15 and
derives utility above $15 from reading the book. Donating the book after use will
enhance the utility of the donor further.31
2. Positive Externality from the Right to Resell
The potential utility to be derived by the users of secondhand copies can be
considered as a positive externality arising from the initial purchase of a digital copy
with the right to resell. An externality is a benefit obtained or a loss suffered by
people who are not parties to a transaction.32 In this example, the copyright holder of
a book and the initial purchaser of a copy of the book may not take into account the
utility future users of the copy would derive. As a result, some transactions between
the copyright holders and prospective buyers would not occur simply because the
private benefit derived by a purchaser (e.g., $10) from reading the book is less than
the price of the book (e.g., $15), even though total benefit derived from the book by all
users is, for instance, $20. If, however, the above purchaser can sell the copy at a
price above $5, he may be willing to buy the book. The second purchaser may derive
another $10 worth utility from the purchase of the copy in the secondhand market at
a price above $5, but below $10. Thus, the total utility derived by these two users of
the book is $20. This utility may be lost in the absence of resale right in a digital
See generally SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 58-59.
It is noteworthy here that it is the first sale doctrine that made it possible for public libraries
to lend their books to patrons without any permission from copyright holders.
30 A donor obtains both utility and disutility from a donation. The disutility is the cost of
donation while the utility is the good feeling arising from the donation. A donor would make the
donation when his net utility is positive.
31 See example infra note 32. It can be proven that a person, who would not otherwise buy a
book because his private benefit from reading the book (e.g., $10) is lower than the price of the book
(e.g., $15), may decide to buy the book when he could donate the book as long as the total utility
derived from reading and donation together is greater than the price of the book.
32 See Muhammad M. Billah, The Role of Insurance in Providing Adequate Compensation and in
Reducing Pollution Incidents: The Case of the International Oil Pollution Liability Regime, 29 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 42, 65-66 (2011), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/46710367.pdf (defining the meaning
of ‘externality’).
28
29
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work. The same example could be used for donation. A person whose utility from
reading a book (e.g., $10) is lower than the price of book (e.g., $15) may be motivated
to purchase a copy of the book if he could donate it afterwards because of additional
utility he would derive from the donation (e.g., utility worth any amount above $5 in
our example).
As mentioned earlier, when some users of a digital work, who would not
otherwise buy the work because of its monopoly price, receive the work free through
donation or at a lower price from a previous user, they derive certain benefits from
the use. Such benefits would be lost if the purchaser of a digital copy cannot transfer
the copy to others. The presence of this positive externality suggests that market
transaction for digital works without the right to transfer will not capture the full
potential benefits of a transaction, and that there is a need for legislative
intervention.33 Thus, copyright laws should be amended to ensure the continuation of
the right to transfer in both digital and analog works.
As mentioned earlier, some copyright holders use legal means to characterize
the transactions involving the transfer of digital works as ‘license,’ and put
restrictions on further transfer of such copy in the license agreements. As argued
earlier,34 the long and indefinite duration of such transactions makes them more of a
‘sale’ than ‘license’. Even if we consider the acquisition of a digital work as a license,
the inability to transfer such licensed copy would cause social loss. The argument
here is the same as the one that relates to the mutual benefits of trade between two
parties. Whether the person who obtains a digital copy of a work is considered as an
owner of the copy or as a licensee, his ability to transfer the copy would enhance the
utility or welfare of both the transferor and the transferee when the value of the
transferred digital work is more to the transferee than to the transferor. Thus, any
restriction in license against the transfer of a digital work would generate social loss
if upheld by the courts.
3. Ensuring Availability of Digital Works
A strong argument for the first-sale doctrine in the context of analog works is
that a secondhand market ensures the availability of a work long after its
publication.35 A book may be out of print, and the publisher may not run a reprint
simply because doing so is not economically viable for the publisher due to low
demand for the book.36 A digital work, however, may never be out of print as an
additional digital copy can always be made almost instantaneously and without
much cost. Yet, it is possible to prove that in the absence of secondary market for
digital works, a digital work also may not be available. For example, the copyright
holder in a digital work may decide not to sell the work anymore because of some
33 See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932) (refer to for examples of
classical works on externalities and the need for regulations to address externalities).
34 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402
F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005); Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp. 2012 E.C.R. I-0000
(available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0128) (For
additional explanation, refer to the discussion in the background section.).
35 See Katz, supra note 8, at 110-111.
36 See Perzanowski & Shultz, supra note 18, at 895.
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embarrassing or controversial contents of the work.37 As similar situations have
occurred in the past, we cannot rule out their reoccurrence in the future, whether the
work in question is digital or analog. For example, CBS decided not to air its radio
and TV series ‘The Amos ‘n’ Andy Show’ because of its offensive content.38 Similarly,
the Worldwide Church of God, which had copyright in the book, Mystery of the Ages,
decided to withdraw it from distribution and use.39 In the absence of a first sale
doctrine to digital works, the right-holder can control access to a work, and can stop
distributing the work without any alternative means for a new user to buy the work
from the secondary market – especially if the work has no analog version.
4. Improvement of Competition
First sale doctrine may promote competition among various sellers of the same
copyrighted works including digital works. This may happen both in the retail
market and in the secondary market. Once copyright holders sell their works to
retailers, retailers should be free to charge any price they want. This will increase
competition among retailers and will lower the price of copyrighted works. Second,
once retailers sell the copyrighted works to users, users should be free to resell their
copies at a price they like. The ability of users to resell their copies may put more
competitive pressure on the copyright holders to reduce the price of their works, and
to bring the price of the works to their marginal cost of production after recouping
their cost of development.40 In the absence of first sale doctrine, copyright holders
may control the price at both levels. Copyright holders may impose on retailers of the
works various restraints including minimum retail price, maintenance to keep the
price high and, in the context of digital works, may use technologies to prevent users
from reselling the digital works. This reduces competition and may keep the price of
the works high.41
37 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341,
1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (It is notable here that an author has the right to withdraw his work from
circulation. The right is indicated in article II (8) of the Appendix to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. Such right of withdrawal, however, does not allow the author to
retake the copies already sold from their purchasers even if it is possible to do so. Thus, interested
readers and researchers in the future can obtain the copy of such a work from the secondary market.
This would not be possible for a digital work after its withdrawal if there is no right or ability of a
purchaser to resell or transfer the copy she purchased before the withdrawal of the book. This would
deprive a researcher or a reviewer to know about the work and the reasons for its withdrawal.).
38 See Hinkes, supra note 18, at 703-704; see also Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir.
1989); Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000).
39 Id.
40 See generally SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 138-140. Copyrighted works have at least two types
of costs: the costs of development and the costs of production or publication. The former involves the
time and expenses an author incurs in coming up with the ideas expressed in a copyrighted work,
while the latter covers the cost of printing or publishing the work. For an additional digital copy, the
marginal cost of publication may be very negligible.
41 See MANKIW, supra note 20, at 90-91. Even though holders of intellectual properties have
monopoly on their works, whether they can charge very high price for their copyrighted materials
and patented inventions depends on the price elasticity of demand for a particular copyrighted work
or a patented product. If the demand for the particular product is inelastic (i.e., price elasticity of

[18:123 2018] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

132

Historically, any restraints imposed by copyright holders on the resale of a work
or on its price were considered anti-competitive. In fact, the origin of the first sale
doctrine in the U.S.A. was a court decision against the restraints imposed by a
publisher on the minimum price at which retailers must sell the copies of a
copyrighted work.42 Such restraints from producers or copyright holders on the chain
of distribution are called “vertical restraints” or “post-sale restraint.”43 While in the
past vertical restraints per se were considered illegal, courts and commentators today
do not categorically consider such restraints as illegal. They determine the legality or
otherwise of such restraints through a case-by-case analysis of their effects on
competition, known as the “rule of reason” test. In other words, such restraints would
be illegal only if they are unreasonable and stifle the competition.44
This change in the attitude of the courts led some authors to argue that today
the first sale doctrine relies on a very weak foundation,45 and thus should not be
applied to digital works.46 Even if vertical restraints could be justified on the
distribution chain from publishers to distributors and retailers, such restraints on
the ultimate user of a copyrighted work have no justifications. As discussed above,
restraints such as the prohibition or prevention of resale or donation of a digital work
reduce the utility of both the procurer of an initial copy and the purchasers of used
copies from the secondary market. Authors who argue against the use of copyright
exhaustion as a means to prevent anti-competitive practices usually limit their
discussion on possible pro-competitive benefits of such restraints on the retailers of
copyrighted works.47 Their arguments, thus, do not prove that restricting the ability
of an ultimate user to resell digital copies of copyrighted works in the secondhand
market is also pro-competitive and beneficial for the market of the copyrighted
works. In fact, the arguments supporting vertical restraints in certain cases do not
even seem relevant for restricting resale of copyrighted works, whether digital or
analog, by a user of those works, as such restraints mainly aim at restricting intracompetition among distributors.

demand is less than 1), then the price increase will lead to an increase in the total revenue. On the
other hand, if the price elasticity of demand for the product is elastic (i.e., price increase leads to a
greater decrease in the demand), the increase of price will lead to revenue loss. The determination of
elasticity or inelasticity of demands depends on various factors such as availability of close
substitutes, the nature of the work i.e., whether it is necessity or luxury, and time horizon etc.
42 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
43 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine
in
Perspective,
66
N.Y.U.
ANN.
SURV.
OF
A M.
L.
487,
487-489
(2011),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2817&context=faculty_scholarship.
44 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (In this case, the
US Supreme Court abolished per se prohibition of vertical restraints on the resale price maintenance
terms.).
45 See Rub, supra note 5, at 754-759.
46 Id. at 747-748.
47 See Rub, supra note 5, at 754-759; Katz, supra note 8, at 70-74; see also Katz, supra note 8, at
84-89.
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5. Right to Alienate One’s Property
When a copy of a copyrighted work is sold, the copy becomes the property of the
purchaser. Both physical properties and intellectual properties come with a bundle of
rights. This bundle usually includes both the right to use and the right to transfer
the property. As argued earlier, the ability to transfer a purchased copy after its use
facilitates a mutually beneficial transaction between the purchaser of the new copy,
and subsequent purchasers of the used copy. Historically under common law, any
restraints on the alienation of property were considered automatically illegal. While
this rule was originally used in the context of restraints on real estates, the rule was
extended to intellectual property. This was an additional justification of the first-sale
doctrine.48 Although today the invalidity of such restraints on the alienation of
property is not automatic and depends on a case-by-case analysis of reasonableness
of such restraints, there appears to be no justified grounds apart from extracting
greater profit for copyright holders through such restraints on the resale of a digital
copy. Thus, this change in the application of the above common law rule with regard
to real estates should not be a reason for the abolition of first-sale doctrine, either in
analog works or digital works, contrary to the belief of some authors.49
6. Protection of Privacy in Reading
In the context of digital works, a serious concern about the privacy of readers
exists. People who purchase and read a digital works can be easily identified, and
their reading history can be tracked through digital right management
technologies.50 This concern would remain whether or not the purchaser of digital
copy has the right to resell the copy, unless the copyright holder or publisher is
prohibited from tracking the purchasers of used digital copies after they’ve been
resold. Such prohibition would not have its full intended benefit in the absence of a
first sale doctrine to digital works. If first sale doctrine does not apply to digital
works, every reader has to purchase the copy of a work directly from the publishers
or publishers’ agents. Such a purchase may reveal private information about the
purchaser. A person interested in buying a book about alcohol addiction may be
viewed as an alcoholic himself; with the availability of a first sale doctrine in digital
works, this person can avoid buying the book directly from the publisher, thus
preventing the publisher from knowing who is reading the book after its resale. This
would be true only if publishers cannot use digital rights management technologies
to track the devices on which the digital book is read after its resale, and also to track
the identity of the devices’ owners. To prevent such tracking, it should be made
illegal for a publisher to continue tracking after a work has been sold to the first
buyer.
48 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (“[T]he ‘first sale’ doctrine
is a common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree.”).
49 See Rub, supra note 5, at 759-762 (arguing against first sale doctrine based on this change).
50 See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 29 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cg
i/viewcontent.cgi?article=1815&context=facpub.
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7. Saving in Information Cost
In the absence of copyright exhaustion for digital works, purchasers of digital
copies may incur information costs concerning their ability to resell the copies. This
arises due to a variety of practices among sellers of digital works. For some digital
works, purchasers have the ability to resell them. Yet, for others, purchasers cannot
resell. Such information is important for purchasers in making their decision to
purchase the copy in the first place. The information cost here involves the time and
effort spent by a prospective purchaser to find out whether she would be able to resell
the copy. The application of first-sale doctrine or copyright exhaustion eliminates this
cost as the purchaser would always have the right to resell the copy.51 This cost may
vary from purchaser to purchaser. Repeat purchasers may incur lower cost than the
ordinary purchasers. Regardless of its amount, this cost is not completely eliminated
with the absence of a first-sale doctrine in digital works.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Arguments Against the Resale of Digital Works and Their Rebuttal
1. Exclusive Right of Reproduction
One of the main arguments against the application of the first-sale doctrine to
digital works is the prohibition against reproduction of a copyrighted material. When
the purchaser of a digital copy transfers the copy to someone else, the copyrighted
work is reproduced in the process. The transferee gets not the exact purchased copy
of the work, but a different copy reproduced from the purchased copy. Under
copyright laws, the right of reproduction (i.e., the right to make a copy) is granted
exclusively to the copyright holder.52 This is why in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi
Inc53 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
resale of a digital work was not covered by the first sale doctrine. According to the
court, the doctrine did not apply to digital works separate from the physical medium
(e.g., CD, phone, computers, etc.) on which the works were embodied.54 This was
despite the fact that the defendant used technology to ensure that the original
purchased copy was deleted from the initial purchaser after reselling it to another
person.
The court’s reasoning in the ReDigi case is very technical and literal
interpretation of the law. If we look at some of the earlier American and Canadian
See Perzanowski & Shultz, supra note 18, at 896-897.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Royal Decree 65, art. 6(a),
(2008 Oman); Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, art. 3(1)(a), (Can.).
53 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
54 Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp. 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 (available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0128). In contrast, the
European Union Court of Justice held that the doctrine of exhaustion applied to the digital copy of a
software.
51
52
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cases decided in the non-digital context, we can easily consider reproduction of digital
work for the purpose of resale valid as long as there is no additional copy left after
the transfer. For example, in the Canadian case of Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit
Champlain inc.,55 the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
simultaneous transfer of a work to a new medium and the destruction of the
purchased copy on the old medium did not leave more than one copy, and thus such
transfer should not be considered ‘reproduction’ for the purpose of copyright law. The
case involved a chemical process through which both the image and the ink from a
paper-based art work were lifted and transferred to a canvas, thus leaving the paper
(poster) blank once the transfer was complete. The copyright holder in the posters
sued the art gallery which used the process to transfer the work for infringing the
former’s exclusive right of reproduction. The court held that the alleged process was
simply a transfer from one display to another and not a reproduction. As the art
gallery was the legitimate purchasers of the posters, it had the right to make the
transfer.56 In its interpretation of the word “reproduction,” the court looked at the
word in its historical context and held that the exclusive right of “reproduction” was
granted to copyright holders under copyright law to prevent others from making
additional copies.57 As the process in question involved making no additional copies,
there was no reproduction.
If we consider the purpose behind the prohibition of reproduction, we see that
under normal circumstances, the reproduction of a copyrighted work deprives
copyright holders of the economic benefits they would otherwise obtain by selling
additional copies. This does not happen when there is only one copy left after the
resale of a digital copy. When there are no additional copies after a digital transfer is
made through temporary reproduction, such reproduction does not affect the
economic interest of copyright holders. This approach was also adopted in an earlier
American case, C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan.58 The case also involved the transfer of
some copyrighted designs from greeting cards and note pads to ceramic plaques
through certain chemical process. Each transfer to a ceramic plaque required the
purchase of a separate copyrighted artwork. When the copyright holder in the
designs sued the purchaser of the greeting cards and note pads for the transfer of the
designs, the court held that the process did not amount to “reproduction.” According
to the court, the purchaser of a copy selling a copyrighted product with another
product did not infringe copyright as long as there was no “reproduction” in the sense
of an additional copy. The court reasoned that “reproduction” implied that a new copy
was made while the original copy still existed. As the alleged chemical process
removed the design and the ink from the original artwork, there was no reproduction
for the purpose of copyright infringement.

[2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (Can.).
Id. at 344-345 (according to the majority of the court, “They purchased lawfully reproduced
posters of his paintings and used a chemical process that allowed them to lift the ink layer from the
paper (leaving it blank) and to display it on canvas. They were within their rights to do so as owners
of the physical posters (which lawfully incorporated the copyrighted expression). At the end of the
day, no new reproductions of the respondent’s works were brought into existence.”) (emphasis
added).
57 Id. at 338.
58 C. M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 192 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
55
56
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Based on these cases, it can be argued that if the purchased digital copy is
destroyed at the same time a new copy is made for resale or donation, then there
would be no violation of copyright holder’s exclusive right of “reproduction.” The case
of C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan was brought to the attention of the District Court in the
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.59 The court in the latter case attempted to
distinguish the earlier case by briefly stating that no new material was created when
the design was lifted from greeting cards to ceramic plaques. The reasoning of the
court appears to be very weak. If the transfer of music files from someone’s phone or
computer to ReDigi’s server amounts to the creation of new material, why a transfer
of design and ink from a greeting card to ceramic plaque would not create a new
material? In both cases, the work is transferred to a new medium without leaving a
copy on the old medium.
Even if a digital transfer is considered a “reproduction” of the original copy, such
reproduction could be justified under the three-step test of the Berne Convention.60
According to article 9(2) of the Berne Convention,61 national legislation can allow
exceptions to the right of reproduction if the following three conditions are satisfied:
a) the reproduction exceptions are only for special cases; b) such exceptions do not
interfere with the normal exploitation of the work; and c) they do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. Reproduction for the purpose of
transferring a digital copy can be considered a “special case” because such
reproduction is necessary to resell the purchased digital copy, and the reproduction is
limited only for the purpose of digital transfer. Such reproduction will not interfere
with the normal exploitation of the copyrighted work as there would be no additional
copies made in the process and thus will not prevent the copyright holder from
exploiting the copyrighted works economically. Finally, it is hard to see how such a
reproduction for digital transfer would unreasonably prejudice any other legitimate
interests of copyright holders.
In addition, such temporary reproduction for the purpose of resale or donation
may be covered by a fair use exception if we again assume that the transfer of digital
work amounts to ‘reproduction’. Under the fair use doctrine, use of copyrighted
material such as copying an entire work, or part of a work, may be permitted if
certain factors are met. The factors include: the purpose of the use, the nature of the
work, the amount of copying, and the effect of the copying on the potential market for

Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 650-651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341,
1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (It is notable here that an author has the right to withdraw his work from
circulation. The right is indicated in article II (8) of the Appendix to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. Such right of withdrawal, however, does not allow the author to
retake the copies already sold from their purchasers even if it is possible to do so. Thus, interested
readers and researchers in the future can obtain the copy of such a work from the secondary market.
This would not be possible for a digital work after its withdrawal if there is no right or ability of a
purchaser to resell or transfer the copy she purchased before the withdrawal of the book. This would
deprive a researcher or a reviewer to know about the work and the reasons for its withdrawal.).
61 Id. (Article 9(2) provides, “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to
permit the reproduction of such works [literary and artistic works] in certain special cases, provided
that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”).
59
60
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the work.62 Courts usually consider the last factor i.e., the effect of copying on its
economic exploitation as one of the most important factors in deciding fair use.63 As
stated above, reproduction for the purpose of resale of a digital work does not create
any additional copies, and thus does not negatively affect the financial interest of the
copyright owner.64 Even though the entire work is reproduced in the process, and
thus the factor related to the amount of copying appears to weigh against such
reproduction, the reproduction here does not cause greater harm than what is fair
and permissible under current copyright laws (i.e., the resale of a copy by its
legitimate purchaser). The sole purpose of such temporary reproduction is to transfer
a lawfully purchased copy – a purpose permitted under the copyright law, specifically
under the first sale doctrine. Finally, the weight of the factor related to the nature of
copying seems to be neutral in such a reproduction, whether the work is highly
creative or informative has no relevance for such a reproduction.65 Also, the question
of resale right in an unpublished work does not arise here, as our topic relates to the
resale right in a purchased copy of a published work.66
In addition, in the context a of “computer program,” copyright laws allow the
legitimate owner of the copy of a computer program to reproduce copies – either to
use the program in a different computer, or to save it for future use by the owner in
case the original is lost or damaged.67 While some suggest that the words “computer
programs” mainly cover computer software,68 such a narrow interpretation is not
indispensable under the law. Under American Copyright Act, “computer program” is
defined as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result.”69 This definition is broad enough
to cover software, e-books, and any other digital works. While a computer program in
the form of software has a different function from that of an e-book, “computer
programs” are considered “literary works” alongside books under the Berne

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (quoting Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court considered
this factor to be the single most important factor in the determination of fair use of copyrighted
works.); see also Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy
Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 153 (1998), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=506
983; Ysolde Gendreau, Intellectual Property Colloquium Series: Canada and the Three-Step Test: A
Step in Which Direction?, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 309, 365 (2011),
https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol15/iss2/3/.
64 See generally John T. Mitchell, DRM: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Colleges, Code and
Copyright: The Impact of Digital Networks and Technological Controls on Copyright, in
Librarianship No. 56, (2004), http://interactionlaw.com/documentos/DRM_good_bad_ugly.pdf (last
visited Aug. 12, 2018) (Symposium sponsored by the Center for Intellectual Property in the Digital
Environment, University of Maryland University College, Adelphi, Maryland, U.S.A.).
65 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532-1533 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
66 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T.
1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3; Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985).
67 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2018); Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, art. 30.6, (Can.); Law on
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Royal Decree 65, art. 20(5), (2008 Oman).
68 See Mulligan, supra note 7, at 475; U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and Digital Files,
COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-digital.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).
69 17 U.S.C. § 101.
62
63
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Convention.70 The main point to emphasize here is that copyright laws allow
reproduction of a computer program, when doing so is essential for the utilization of
the program or for archival purposes. Logically, reproduction for the purpose of
transfer is also necessary for the exercise of a right guaranteed under copyright laws
(i.e., the first sale doctrine), and thus should be also allowed. In both cases, such a
reproduction does not affect copyright holders more than what is permissible under
copyright laws.
2. Non-degradability and Easy Transferability of Digital Works
Other arguments against the resale of digital works would also not withstand
any critical evaluation of their merits. Below, I state some of these arguments first,
and then rebut them. First, digital works, unlike their physical counterparts, do not
degrade with the time and use. Consequently, the used and new digital works are
indistinguishable from each other. Thus, the argument goes that the resale of digital
goods affects copyright holders more seriously than cases involving the resale of
analog works. Second, geographical barriers and transportation cost do not exist in
the context of digital goods. It is argued that such barriers work as the natural brake
on the negative effect of resale on the copyright holders’ market share.71 If anything,
these arguments simply prove the benefits of digital works both for users and holders
of copyrighted works in digital format. They do not deprive copyright holders of their
right to exploit their works economically to recoup their development costs, and also
to earn the necessary profits to encourage the creation and distribution of
copyrighted works in the first place.
All the arguments in the above paragraph against the application of a first sale
doctrine in digital works revolve around the potential monetary loss copyright
holders would suffer due to the resale or rent of digital works by the purchaser of a
copy. If a person purchases a digital copy of a book and if he can sell or rent the copy
to another person, this will reduce the number of copies the copyright holder could
sell. This is because only the people who want to read the book within the first few
days or weeks of its publication would buy digital copies directly from the copyright
holder. Others who can wait would rather borrow, rent, or purchase their copies from
the first purchasers at a reduced price. While this also happens for an analog book,
there are some limitations in the non-digital world. First, it is difficult for an
interested reader to know who has purchased a particular book unless the purchaser
happens to be a friend, close family member, or neighbor of the interested party. In
the digital world, this barrier can be easily overcome through online book forums if
divided into different genres. Second, in the analog world, even if an interested
reader wants to borrow a book from a friend or family member, and if they are not
70 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 10(1), Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (Article 10(1)
reads, “Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works
under the Berne Convention (1971).” Similarly, WIPO Copyright Treaty provides, “Computer
programs are protected as literary works within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention.
Such protection applies to computer programs, whatever may be the mode or form of their
expression.”).
71 Katz, supra note 8, at 135.
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located close to each other, this would involve cost to ship the book, or wait time
before they can meet each other to hand over the book. This would not be necessary
in the case of digital works. The digital copy of a book can be transferred in seconds.
Third, analog copies will wear and tear over a period of time. Thus, only a limited
number of people, even though large, can use the same analog copy over its lifetime.
This limitation also does not exist in a digital work. A digital copy can last forever.
Now the question is whether the reduced sale of a digital work is a good
justification for preventing the application of the first sale doctrine to digital works.
First of all, even in the case of analog works, the ability to resell a purchased copy of
an analog work reduces the total number of copies the copyright holder can sell. Why
then should this be a valid argument in the context of digital work? A plausible
answer from opponents of the first sale doctrine is that the negative impact in the
form of reduced sale is greater in the context of digital works.72 Yet, it is also true
that in the presence of digital technology and the Internet, copyright holders can
make their works available simultaneously to a larger readership from all over the
world. This may increase the sale of the digital works. Second, even if the gross
revenue from the sale of digital works decreases due to the resale or rent of digital
works, the net revenue for the copyright holder may still be high simply because the
cost of production for digital works may also be less even if we include the sunk cost
of the copyright owner (i.e., the money invested by the copyright holder in
technological equipment in producing digital works).73
3. Reduced Incentives to Create
A related argument against the first sale doctrine, especially in the context of
digital works, is the reduction of incentives to create due to reduced sale of
copyrighted works. As discussed in the above paragraph, reduced sale of a digital
work may not necessarily reduce the profits copyright holders and publishers would
make from a copyrighted work when we compare the potential profits the analog
version of such work would generate in the absence of digital technology. In other
words, while digital technology may allow copyright holders and publishers to make
greater profit and allowing resale of a digital work may reduce some of the additional
profit, their net profit may still be higher than the profit they could make in an
analog world. Now, the question is whether the reduction in the additional profit
would affect the incentives to create? Apparently, the answer may be in the
affirmative because the higher the profit, the greater is the incentive. Greater profits
from copyrighted works would attract more authors and more resources to the
creation of expressive works. Some authors use this line of arguments against the
first sale doctrine.74
See Rub, supra note 5, at 747-748.
R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Do Sunk Costs Matter?, 48 ECON.
INQUIRY 323 (2010), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=E15F6A1CA5DE99D3
545C0A1ECB7D1CDA?doi=10.1.1.212.3067&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Inclusion of sunk cost in a
decision for making a further copy is not considered rational behavior in economics literature.
However, some authors argue that many rationale individuals would include such costs in their
decision making.).
74 See Rub, supra note 5, at 762-773.
72
73
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Creation of more works, however, is not the main goal of copyright laws, let
alone the sole goal. Promotion of education is the primary goal of copyright law.75
Achievement of this goal requires striking a fine balance between two opposing
objectives: access and incentives.76 Abolishing the first sale doctrine and other rights
of users, such as fair use, will provide greater incentive to create by allowing
copyright holders to sell more copies, and potentially to sell them at a higher price.
Such measures, however, would also limit users’ access to copyrighted works. Under
our current copyright system, it is impossible to have both greater access to
copyrighted works and a heightened incentive to create.77 First sale doctrine and fair
use exceptions to the rights of copyright holders are designed to strike this balance. If
the doctrine is justified in analog works, it may be more so in digital works due to
higher profits publishers and copyright holders can make from digital works even
with the presence of a first sale doctrine.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Necessary Legislative Changes to Protect the First Sale Doctrine in Digital Works
In light of the above-mentioned benefits of the first sale doctrine, the doctrine
must be preserved in digital works by making some legislative changes, both at
international and national levels. The doctrine should be made mandatory in the
sense that it would be illegal for copyright holders to prevent the operation of the
doctrine both in digital and in analog works, either through DRM technological
measures, or through contractual means. At least, the doctrine should be made a
strong and “sticky default rule” (i.e., any technological or contractual means used to
deprive its use would be presumptively unlawful unless the copyright holder can
prove that such a restriction is necessary, and more efficient than any other
alternative).78 As for contractual restrictions on transfer of digital works, some
authors suggest that such contractual restrictions should be upheld only in cases of
negotiated contracts, and should be subject to judicial scrutiny in cases of standardform contracts.79 In addition, if the transaction is a sale contract in its true nature, as
opposed to license, any restriction on alienation or transfer should be illegal.

75 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (This clause states, “The Congress shall have Power … to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
76 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (“The [Copyright] Act creates a balance between
the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s
need for access to creative works.”).
77 SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 162-164. An alternative to current copyright system is state
reward system. Under the state reward system, the state would reward authors and artists for their
creation. Authors and artists would not have any copyright right in their works. Anyone can copy
the works. Under such a reward system, it is possible to have both higher incentive and greater
access. Yet, the reward system has its own disadvantages due to the difficulty in assessing the value
of a work, in determining the right amount of reward, and in financing the system.
78 Katz, supra note 8, at 63, 101.
79 See Rub, supra note 5, at 748.
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From the current statutes and case law, it is not clear whether a first sale
doctrine is a mandatory rule, or a default one.80 Upon analysis of current case law,
some authors suggest that the first sale doctrine now operates as a weak default
rule.81 As a result, copyright holders can easily modify the application of the doctrine
by DRM technological measures and contractual provisions. The fact that the first
sale doctrine is a weak default rule is partly due to the view held by many people
that the doctrine is a defense, not an affirmative right of users.82 According to that
view, copyright exceptions, including the first sale doctrine, are defenses rather than
enforceable rights. As a result, copyright holders are not obliged to grant users of
copyrighted works the ability to utilize these exceptions in the context of digital
works, which are usually protected by DRM technologies.83
As for the scope of the first sale doctrine in the context of digital works, the
doctrine should apply without any restriction of national boundaries. In other words,
international exhaustion should apply to digital works. That is, when a person
purchases a copy of a digital work, the purchaser of the copy should be able to resell
it to anyone from any part of the world. This is due to the fact that the digital world
knows no boundary. Restricting the right of resale only to national market (i.e.,
national exhaustion rule) would be very difficult to implement in the digital world.
Even if it is possible to implement by certain technological means, such a restriction
cannot be justified, especially when the initial sale of digital works is not so
restricted. In the context of analog works, publishers may maintain price
discrimination and thus sell the same work at different prices in different countries.
Despite such price discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held84 that the
copyright exhaustion applied to books sold in foreign markets at a much lower price
than the price in American market, that were then imported in the U.S.A. for resale.
Even if there is any justification for restricting the application of a first sale
doctrine to national market in the context of analog works due to different prices in
different markets, no such justification exists for digital works, which are usually
sold over the Internet at the same price to users from all over the world. It is notable
here that countries differ in their application of copyright exhaustion in the context
of analog works.85 Some apply national exhaustion, while others follow international
exhaustion. European Union nations, on the other hand, stick to regional exhaustion.
Such differences may be attributed to the lack of any provision in the international
conventions on copyrights. The Berne Convention is silent on the issue.86 The TRIPS
Agreement87 specifically states that none of its provisions addresses the issue of
exhaustion.
In the U.S.A., section 104 of the DMCA requires the Registrar of the Copyright
Office and the Department of Commerce to study the impact of the digital protection
Katz, supra note 8, at 61.
Id. at 101.
82 Vasiliki Samartzi, Digital Rights Management and the Rights of End-Users, QUEEN MARY
UNIV. OF LONDON (2013), https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/8642/Sam
artzi_V_PhD_final.pdf?sequence=1.
83 Id.
84 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1391 (2013).
85 Rub, supra note 5, at 751.
86 Rub, supra note 5, at 752.
87 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 70, art. 6.
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measures under the DMCA on the first sale doctrine. In August 2001, the Copyright
Office issued its report88 to Congress. The report concluded that, at that time, there
was no widespread use of technological measures or, if there was, such measures did
not interfere with the right to resell digital works in the secondary market in a way
that would constitute a serious threat to the first sale doctrine. Thus, the report
made no recommendation for any changes in the existing law on the first sale
doctrine. The report also rejected proposals made by various stakeholders to include
express provisions in the Copyright Act to enable purchasers of digital works to resell
the works.89 A similar conclusion was also drawn earlier by a presidential task force
in 1995. The task force concluded that a first sale doctrine under §109(a) of U.S.
Copyright Act was not applicable to the retransmission (resale) of digital works
acquired by email or download.90 Following this conclusion there were several
attempts to amend §109 to include the application of the first sale doctrine to digital
works.91 These attempts, however, did not yet translate into any legislative changes
to guarantee the rights of users under the first sale doctrine to digital works. In the
2001 report, however, the Copyright Office recognized that if the use of technological
measures to prevent resale became widespread, it may have serious repercussions on
the ‘first sale doctrine.’92 Today in 2018, we can confidently say that the use of DRM
technologies is widespread and prevents purchasers of digital copies from exercising
a right guaranteed under copyright laws.
V. CONCLUSION
At the time of the adoption of the WIPO’s Internet treaties and the
implementing national legislation such as the DMCA, technology did not exist to
ensure the deletion of a digital file from the medium on which it was attached once
the file was transferred to another medium.93 This was one of the reasons for the lack
of clear provision on the first sale doctrine in the DMCA.94 As technology now exists
to ensure the deletion of a purchased copy after its transfer to another person or to
another device, the digital transfer of a copy for the purpose of sale or donation
should not be characterized as a “reproduction” if there is no additional copy left after
the transfer. Some courts, like the court in the Capital Records v. ReDigi case, may
not be willing to use this interpretation of the word “reproduction.” Therefore, it

88 U.S. Copyright Office, A Report of the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to §104 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (2001), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studie
s/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf [hereinafter DMCA Section 104 Report].
89 Id. at 78-101; see generally Reese, supra note 6, at 582.
90 Ronald H. Brown, The Report of the Working Group of Intellectual Property Rights, 5 BUS. L.
TODAY 60 (1996), https://www.cedb.gov.hk/citb/doc/en/Councils_Boards_Committees/Final_Report_E
ng.pdf.
91 Reese, supra note 6, at 581.
92 U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 88, at 75-76; see also Mitchell, supra note 64, at 19.
93 Hinkes, supra note 18, at 697 (summarizing one of the arguments against the application of
first sale doctrine to digital works).
94 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Public Hearing Filed in Response to 65 FR 63626,
(2000) (statement by Bernard Sorkin, Time Warner Inc.), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/
dmca/testimony/summ09 (last visited Aug. 12, 2017).
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would be better to modify the existing copyright laws to explicitly guarantee the
application of the first sale doctrine to digital works.

